



CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT

FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

Transcript

## 2010 CARNEGIE INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR POLICY CONFERENCE

TUESDAY, MARCH 29, 2011

3:45 P.M.

WASHINGTON, D.C.

**WELCOME:**

**Jessica Mathews**

President,

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

**SPEAKER:**

**Tom Donilon**

National Security Advisor

The White House

Transcript by Federal News Service

Washington, D.C.

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JESSICA MATHEWS: I mentioned in opening the conference yesterday that we've been doing this since 1989. And I think – I think I've been to them all. And based on the bits of this conference that I've been able to sit in on, and the things that I've heard about the parts that I missed, I think that this has been the best installment of any of them.

And I want to acknowledge first the grandfather of this – of these conferences, the founder of them, Sandy Spector, and the father who reimagined them, took them international, made them a whole lot bigger, Joe Cirincione, and now our third generation of leadership, George Perkovich, who has not only assembled a breathtaking team of experts in our nuclear policy program, but has taken these meetings from strength to strength to strength. So George, wherever you are – (applause).

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Second, I want to extend our very sincere, deep gratitude to all our speakers and moderators. They provide the content and the quality that makes these meetings what they are. And third, I want to say that, you know, a great conference, like a great university, is not defined by the faculty just, but by the student body. And what makes these meetings so worth coming to is all of you. Thank you all for being here.

We have a fitting climax to a really superb two days of meetings in being able to have the privilege of hearing from President Obama's national security advisor, which gives me the pleasure of introducing an old friend, a good friend, Tom Donilon. Tom is, as you know, as I just said, national security advisor, and before that, served as principal deputy national security advisor.

In the Clinton administration, he was an assistant secretary of state and chief of staff to Warren Christopher, then-secretary, whose passing we mourn. In that role as chief of staff, he of course became intimate with the entire scope of American foreign policy, and was recognized, his work was recognized, with the State Department's highest award, the Distinguished Service Award, in 1996 for his work then.

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He served also as a young man, a very young man, in the Carter White House. And between all these stints in government, he's pursued a career as a practicing attorney and for some years as general counsel and executive president of Fannie Mae – a distinguished and busy career.

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For his whole working life, Tom has studied and worked on and cared deeply about the decisions that get made at the intersection of politics and policy, and the role of good process, of disciplined process, in successful policymaking.

Since his long stint at the State Department, his focus has narrowed in on the area of international relations. And he has made that his area of concentration, and has now reached the pinnacle in our government in that service. So it's a – it's a very great privilege and just a great pleasure to introduce him to you, and to welcome him to the Carnegie conference. (Applause.)

[00:07:08]

TOM DONILON: Thank you very much, Jessica. And it's really a delight to be here at the 2011 international nuclear policy conference. Thank you for mentioning Warren Christopher. I appreciate the flexibility in your changing schedule around that allowed me to head out to his memorial service yesterday. And of course, these issues of nonproliferation, disarmament, nuclear policy generally were issues he cared about deeply and worked on for a long time. And it was a wonderful service yesterday in Los Angeles, and a tribute to one of the nation's really great servants and great gentlemen. So thank you for mentioning that – mentioning that, Jessica.

And I am delighted to be here. The role that you all play is really critical. And you really see it – see it from the inside even more than you do from the outside, frankly: The need for intellectual capital, for ideas and analysis and critiques on policy are absolutely essential. You know, the press of business every day – you know, my job begins very early in the morning with just a, you know, kind of an onslaught of issues.

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And the work that you do, that to stay focused on the key issues, and as I said, provide intellectual capital, thoughtful input, new ideas, is really critical. And you really should not underestimate the impact that you have, or the importance of the work that people like this in this room do every single day. And it's very much appreciated.

I could spend quite a bit of time, as Gary and Lauren and others know, talking to you today about the articles and the pieces that you've written, that I've read and asked them about, that really have informed our approach. And it's very much appreciated. And I urge you to stay with it, and you know, to give us a good kick when we need it as well. It makes a – it makes a difference, frankly. A good critique, holding policymakers accountable to the best possible decisions, is absolutely essential. And many people in this room are about doing that, and that's a really critical function in our system of government.

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And I was about to say, we welcome it; that's not exactly right. (Laughter.) But we appreciate it at some level – (chuckles) – with respect to our decision making.

Additionally, as I've gotten into these issues again during the Obama administration – you know, I understand that this is really the annual conclave of what I call the world's nuclear security priesthood of sorts. And although I haven't gained official admission to that society, I've spent enough hours, I think, on the topic of nuclear weapons arms control, nonproliferation issues over the last two years to qualify as a senior seminarian of sorts.

And the reason for that is quite straightforward, and that's President Obama. In the course of providing the president's morning briefing every day – and I think today I passed a 400<sup>th</sup> morning briefing this morning – chairing interagency meetings and coordinating U.S. government policy, I have seen firsthand – and I know you know this – how the president's deep commitment and personal involvement is the driving force behind our nuclear strategy, and the approach that we have taken indeed – I'll just depart from my prepared text for a second – because Jessica mentioned process here.

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And I'll review today where we've been and what I think we've gotten done, and the plans we have for building on that over the next – over the next couple of years. But we really have had all the elements, I think, here, of a successful policy process even in the face of a lot, as I said, of urgent challenges.

And there are three or four elements to it. We have a leader who cares deeply about it. And as I said, I see this every day. And as a senator and a presidential candidate, President Obama made clear that nuclear nonproliferation would be the centerpiece of his nuclear security agenda. But we also have persistence, and a comprehensive approach – And I'll talk about three or four areas here. And the key is, you got to do all of them, not just any one of them – and accountability.

And we've tried to put in place accountability mechanisms to measure ourselves against the goals that we've set. So we put in place the nuclear security summit process that Gary and Lauren and others are overseeing, and the vice president is in charge of overseeing, to hold ourselves accountable, schedule regional follow-up meetings. We've got a 2012 follow-up meeting in Seoul, which I'll talk about in a second. So I do think from a process perspective, we really have in place here, you know, the formula for real success and real change.

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You know, when President Obama came into office, we had a full range of legacy issues – that's a euphemism that we use – (chuckles) – for the challenges that we had when we came into – when we came into office: two wars that involved tens of thousands of our young men and women abroad combating terrorism; a deep financial crisis.

The president, however, from the outset – and expressly had this conversation with his team – was determined that we would pursue an affirmative agenda as well as dealing with these so-called – with these legacy issues, with the issues that were kind of right in front of us.

And that – you know, this affirmative agenda would be what the United States would stand for in the Obama administration, what American leadership would pursue. And at the center of that affirmative agenda was a new nuclear strategy for the United States, and that's what we have pursued.

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Two years ago, almost two years ago, in the president's speech at Prague, he declared his vision for achieving, and I quote, "peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons," end quote. And he laid out a plan of action for near-term practical steps to move in that direction. You all are very familiar with this; I'll just outline it very briefly.

There are four interrelated elements to the president's Prague agenda: first, to reduce the number and role of nuclear weapons by those states that already possess nuclear weapons, starting first with Russia and the United States, which together still control over 90 percent of the world's nuclear weapons; second, to prevent additional countries from acquiring nuclear weapons by strengthening the international nonproliferation regime by holding accountable those states that violated their obligations, such as Iran and North Korea.

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And there is an – there is an express, underlying assumption there, and policy perspective, and that's this: that these regimes really matter, and that it's kind of ahistorical – I'll leave the text now, Gary. I know we weren't supposed to get into this, but I will anyway – it's ahistorical to contend that, in fact, these regimes don't have an impact, right, over time, with respect to reducing the number of countries that have nuclear weapons.

And the argument that somehow they just – it just constrains those countries that are going to be rogue countries and pursue nuclear weapons outside these regimes is just not – it's just not historically accurate, and it doesn't inform our approach right now.

Third, to prevent nuclear terrorism by securing vulnerable nuclear materials and strengthening international cooperation on nuclear security – right at the core of our approach – and fourth, to develop new mechanisms to support the growth of safe and secure nuclear power in ways that reduce the spread of dangerous technologies. And I'll have something to say about that in light of the events in Japan, in just a minute.

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During the two years since the Prague speech, we've made significant progress in each of these four areas. And if you'll allow me to review just a few of the steps, I think it's worthwhile for the record to do so. In June 2009, in response to North Korea's second nuclear test, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1874, which imposes the toughest sanctions to date against North Korea, including additional measures to interdict shipments of prohibited cargo to and from North Korea.

In September 2009, the United Nations Security Council, meeting for the first time under the chairmanship of a U.S. president, unanimously approved Resolution 1887, endorsing the key elements of the president's Prague agenda. And you all remember that as, really, kind of a signal event in the Obama administration's foreign policy first-term, and for the issues of nonproliferation and disarmament.

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In April 2010, President Obama hosted a historic nuclear security summit of 47 nations and three international organizations here in Washington, at which leaders pledged specific steps to prevent nuclear terrorism and support the president's proposal to lock down all vulnerable nuclear materials in four years. This was the largest gathering of nations hosted by the United States since the U.N. founding conference in San Francisco in 1945 – and on this topic.

Also in April 2010, President Obama issued our Nuclear Posture Review that reduces the role of nuclear weapons in our overall defense posture by declaring that the fundamental role, fundamental role of U.S. nuclear forces is to deter nuclear attacks against the United States and our allies and partners. Our new doctrine also extends U.S. assurances by declaring that we will not use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapons states that are members of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and in compliance with their nonproliferation obligations. That's a mouthful, but I think most of you in this room will get it. And we've obviously spent enormous amount of time on that and it was a – and it's an important part of our Nuclear Posture Review.

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In May, NPT parties met for a review conference approving a final document endorsing a balanced approach to advance three pillars of nuclear non-proliferation, peaceful uses and disarmament. In December, after years of negotiations, the IAEA Board of Governors took a major step approving the establishment of an IAEA fuel bank, which will help assure the reliability of fuel supply and assist countries to use nuclear energy without building fuel-cycle facilities.

Again, departing for a second here from the text, to the members of the press in the audience, this is an under-covered story. And I'd like to – (chuckles) – I'd like to flag it as such, and draw your attention to it.

And finally, just before Christmas, the Senate approved in the lame-duck session the New START treaty, which President Obama and President Medvedev signed last April in Prague. And by significantly reducing levels of U.S- and Russian-deployed strategic weapons, the treaty represents a commitment, as I said earlier, by the world's two largest nuclear powers to the goal of disarmament.

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In addition, this treaty strengthens the reset between – and relations between – Washington and Moscow that is helping us to address the most urgent proliferation threats we face in Iran and in North Korea.

And just to pause on this for a second as well, the president made the decision after the midterm elections, going into the – into the lame-duck session, to pursue this as one of his highest priorities. And it wasn't obvious at the outset of that session that this would get done; it wasn't obvious with respect to the timing. But he was determined to go ahead and really lock in this achievement by the United States, and between the United States and Russia.

Now, those of you – and I know quite a few of you in the room here know me. I'm not really prone to hyperbole. And in my current job, I'm really not that prone to seeing the upside in many things – (chuckles) – right? If you – if you look at what I look at every single morning, you kind of lose sight of the upside of things.

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But having said that, all in all, I think it's fair to say that in the two years since the president's Prague speech, the two years have been exceedingly productive. Despite this progress, however – and this is what I really wanted to drill down on today – we're not going to rest on our laurels. And I can tell you with certainty that President Obama won't allow us to.

Despite the many pressing global challenges that compete for his attention, for our attention, he directed us to keep up the momentum and lay the groundwork for additional progress. And with this in mind, I'd like to address in each of the four areas that I mentioned as the pillars of the Prague agenda our plans to advance each of them.

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First, to reduce the number and role of nuclear weapons, we're beginning to implement the New START treaty with Russia. Last week, we exchanged data with Russia on nuclear facilities. The Bilateral Consultative Commission, the treaty's implementing body – which you all know – is launching its first meetings in Geneva this week. I'm sure Rose will talk to this as well – or, has talked about that.

On-site inspections conducted under the treaty will begin next month. And when the treaty is fully implemented, it will result in the lowest number of deployed nuclear weapons since the 1950s, the first full decade of the nuclear age.

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Now, as we implement New START, we're making preparations for the next round of nuclear reductions. At the president's direction, the Department of Defense will review our strategic requirements and develop options for further reductions in the nuclear – current nuclear stockpile, which stands at approximately 5,000 nuclear warheads, including both deployed and reserved warheads.

To develop these options for further reductions, we need to consider a number of factors. These include potential changes in targeting requirements and alert postures that are required for effective deterrence. Even as we consider further reductions, President Obama has also made clear the United States will retain a safe, secure and effective nuclear arsenal necessary to defend the U.S. and our allies and partners for as long as nuclear weapons exist.

To assure this objective, President Obama is seeking major funding increases to upgrade the Department of Energy's nuclear complex. Indeed, as we made clear during the New START debate last year, it is our intention to invest \$85 billion in the nation's nuclear infrastructure over the next 10 years. We're going to need Congress. You know, we can propose, but the Congress will have to approve here. We need Congress to support the president's budget to ensure these critical investments are made.

The investments – it's an important analytical point. These investments will not only ensure a safe, secure and effective arsenal. They will also facilitate arms reductions. If in fact the Congress approves the president's funding program for the nuclear complex, it will allow us to reduce the size of our nuclear stockpile because we'll be able to maintain a robust hedge against technical problems with a smaller reserve force. It's a very important analytical point with respect to the investments.

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Once it is complete, this review of our strategic requirements will help shape our negotiating approach to the next agreement with Russia, which we believe should include both non-deployed and non-strategic nuclear weapons. Now, our priority will be to address Russian tactical nuclear weapons. We'll work with our NATO allies to shape an approach to reduce the role and number of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons as Russia takes reciprocal measures to reduce its non-strategic forces and relocates its non-strategic forces away from – excuse me – from NATO's borders.

In advance of a new treaty limiting tactical nuclear weapons, we also plan to consult with our allies on reciprocal actions that could be taken on the basis of parallel steps by each side. As a first step, we would like to increase transparency on a reciprocal basis concerning the numbers, locations and types of non-strategic forces in Europe. And we will consult with our European allies and invite Russia to join us to develop this initiative.

Now, achieving the next round of strategic arms reductions will be an ambitious task. It'll take time to complete. No previous arms control agreement has included provisions to limit and monitor non-deployed warheads or tactical warheads. And to do this will require more demanding approaches to verification.

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We are ready to begin discussions soon with Russia on transparency and confidence-building measures that could provide the basis for creative verification measures in the next round of U.S. nuclear arms reductions. And again, pausing on that, that is really something that a group of people like this in this room can really make a

contribution on, in terms of thinking through the additional verification techniques and approaches that might be taken in the next round here.

Now, in parallel with these discussions with Russia, President Obama is committed to developing and deploying an effective missile defense system to defend the United States and its allies against emerging missile threats from countries such as Iran and North Korea. The phased adaptive approach, approved by President Obama in 2009, provides a more effective and a more timely response to the most likely missile threats that we will face in coming years. It is widely regarded as a substantial improvement over the prior program.

And NATO fully embraced this new approach at the Lisbon summit last November – unanimously embraced it at the Lisbon summit last November. You know, when you think about how contentious the subject of missile defense has been, especially in Europe, for many years, it was a significant milestone and a tribute to what's possible when the United States works with allies and partners in the spirit of mutual respect and mutual interest. And again, I think it was quite an achievement at the Lisbon conference to have this unanimously agreed to last November.

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As the president has repeatedly said, our missile defense program does not threaten Russia's strategic deterrence. And against this background, President Obama and President Medvedev have agreed to develop a program of U.S.-Russia missile defense cooperation. And we're in the midst of really working intensively on this right now.

We believe that such cooperation can provide assurance to Russia that our missile defenses will not undercut strategic stability, while enhancing the ability of both nations to defend against emerging missile threats. For example, shared early warning data could increase the effectiveness of our missile defense system in Europe, while the U.S. and NATO retain responsibility for defending themselves against ballistic missile threats.

Now, even as the United States and Russia move to reduce our nuclear arsenals, we must also support multilateral arms control efforts that can help constrain the programs of other countries that possess nuclear weapons. While the U.K. and France have substantially reduced their arsenals from the Cold War levels, a nuclear buildup is underway in Asia, as several countries are modernizing and expanding their nuclear forces.

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China's nuclear arsenal remains much smaller than the arsenals of, obviously, the United States and Russia. Nonetheless, the lack of transparency in the Chinese program, including the pace and scope, the strategy and doctrine guiding it, raises questions about China's future strategic intentions. To address this issue, our nuclear posture review proposes that the U.S. and China engage in a strategic security dialogue that could increase confidence and ease concerns that drive nuclear expansion.

We have encouraged our Chinese counterparts to begin a dialogue with us on nuclear strategies, policies and programs, and we'll continue to do so. I've done this quite directly. I lead our efforts with the Chinese, as most of you know, and we have directly pressed this point on them for the following reason. The Chinese and we pursue, as a mutual goal, a comprehensive, productive and positive relationship. You cannot have a comprehensive relationship between two powers without talking about strategic issues. And so we have been pressing this quite directly with the Chinese. And hopefully we'll make some progress on that dialogue.



Next couple of issues here: 'The CTBT and the FMCT. 'The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty can help to limit modernization and expansion of arsenals among countries that already have nuclear weapons, even in the absence of new arms control measures that would cap and reduce all nuclear arsenals.

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Let me first address the test ban treaty and make a few points. We are committed to working with members of both parties in the Senate to ratify the CTBT, just as we did for New START, which was a truly bipartisan effort. And we addressed it from the outset as a bipartisan effort. We assumed that there would be bipartisan support for the New START treaty at the end and there was. And we'll take a similar approach and make similar assumptions with respect to the CTBT.

Now, we don't have any illusions about – that this will be easy. But we intend to stress three key points as we make our case to the Senate and to the American people. First, CTBT ratification serves America's national security interests because it will help lead others to ratify the treaty and strengthen the legal and political barriers to resumption of nuclear testing, which would fuel the nuclear buildup in Asia which I just mentioned.

Second, more than a decade since the Senate last considered and rejected the CTBT, we are in a stronger position to effectively verify the treaty for the global monitoring system set up under the treaty and our own strengthened national capabilities.

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Third, our expertise with stockpile stewardship – with the stockpile stewardship program has demonstrated that the United States can maintain an effective and reliable nuclear arsenal without nuclear testing. In fact, as I noted, President Obama has funded and is committed to continue to fund four nuclear labs at increased levels to ensure that we have the facilities, resources, personnel needed to retain the nuclear force to defend the United States and our allies.

The FMCT: On the FMCT, President Obama has announced his support for a new international treaty to verifiably end the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons. Such a treaty would clearly reduce the risk of proliferation and nuclear terrorism – absolutely.

Our preference would be to negotiate the FMCT within the conference on disarmament. But it is becoming increasingly doubtful that the conference can achieve consensus to begin such negotiations. And we have tried and repeatedly pushed this at the conference. As a consequence, we will begin consultations with our allies and our partners to consider an alternative means to begin FMCT negotiations. To be successful, we will encourage all permanent members of the Security Council and other relevant parties to participate in our effort.

To advance the second element of the president's Prague agenda, nonproliferation, we're continuing our efforts to strengthen the international regime, as proposed by the Security Council Resolution 1887 in the NPT review conference. In particular, we're working with the IEA to ensure that the agency has the resources, technology and authority it needs to conduct effective monitoring and inspections, especially when doubts are raised about whether nations are fulfilling their international obligations.

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We have strongly supported the agency's investigation of the North Korean-supplied al-Kibar reactor in Syria and nuclear weaponization activities in Iran. And we encourage Director General Amano to report to the board of governors the results of these investigations as soon as possible. We have been very big supporters of the IEA, as you know, and they serve an essential function. And, again, authorities and funding and the technology for that organization to function is absolutely critical.

Now, Iran and North Korea. The world's efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons are of course challenged by Iran and North Korea. I've spent an enormous amount of personal time on this issue and these challenges since we came into office in January 2009. North Korea has conducted nuclear tests, revealed a previously covert enrichment program – a second source, if you will, of material – and continues to develop long-run missiles.

As President Obama has said, and I quote, “North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile program is increasingly a direct threat to the security of the United States and our allies.” We have made this point quite directly to partners in working on this project, especially the Chinese: that this combination of a – multiple sources of material, combined with a missile program going ahead, obviously presents challenges to the nonproliferation regime. It presents challenges to and threats to those in the region. But it presents a direct threat to the national security interests of the United States.

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For its part, Iran continues to pursue an enrichment program in defiance of – in defiance of numerous U.N. Security Council resolutions and refuses to cooperate with the IEA to resolve questions about its past weaponization activities. Of all the NPT parties – and we've made this point directly to the Iranians – Iran is the only country that is not able to convince the IEA that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes. And that's an important statement and an important posture for that to be in. Unless we can meet the challenges both of Iran and North Korea, additional countries in the Middle East and East Asia could well lead the NPT and develop their own nuclear weapons, reversing any movement towards disarmament.

Moreover, Iran and North Korea are challenging the viability and credibility of treaties institutions that form the bedrock for disarmament. No matter how much we strengthen the regime on paper, it will be meaningless if countries feel they can violate the rules with impunity.

Now, on North Korea specifically, since President Obama has taken office, we've made clear that we are prepared to talk directly with the North Koreans and we are open to an agreement that would also provide security for North Korea. And we've been direct with the North Koreans about this since the first month of our administration.

The Six-Party Joint Statement of 2005 provides the framework for such an agreement. At the same time, President Obama has made clear that North Korea can never find the security it seeks unless it fulfills its commitments to complete denuclearization and abides fully by the terms of its international obligations. We and our partners have underscored that North Korea must begin taking irreversible steps towards denuclearization before it can obtain the benefits it seeks from the international community.

North Korea chose, at least to date, not to take such a path, instead reverting to the old pattern of provocation followed by demands for compensation. We have refused to reinforce that pattern. Instead, we've tightened international sanctions, including financial measures and an arms embargo, and we've established an unprecedented level of cooperation – I don't think this is hyperbole – with our allies South Korea and Japan and have worked closely with China and Russia as well.

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In response to this solidarity, in recent months North Korea has begun talking about a return to the Six-Party Talks, which it declared irrevocably dead last summer, and has been making other gestures indicating a desire to return to talks. What we are insisting upon is that the negotiations, as I've said, not repeat the old pattern, but rather that North Korea first needs to engage itself and address issues surrounding its military provocation and then take significant irreversible steps towards the goal of denuclearization. These steps must include monetary (ph) suspension of the newly declared enrichment – uranium-enrichment program.

Now, President Obama has long understood the regional and international consequences of Iran becoming a nuclear-weapons state. That's why we are committed to preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons. From his first days in office, the president made clear to Iran that it has a choice: It can act to restore the confidence of the international community in the purposes of its nuclear program by fully complying with the IEA and the Security Council resolutions or it can continue to shirk its international obligations, which will only increase its isolation and consequences for the regime. There's no escaping or evading the choice.

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Already, Iran is facing sanctions that are far more comprehensive than ever before, and as a result, it finds it hard to do business with any reputable bank internationally, to conduct transactions in – to conduct transactions in Euros or dollars, to acquire insurance for its shipping, to gain new capital investment or technology infusions in its antiquated oil and natural-gas infrastructure. And it has found in that critical sector alone, in the oil and natural-gas sector, close to \$60 billion in projects that have been put on hold or discontinued as a result of the sanctions regime.

Other sectors are clearly being affected as well, as leading multinational corporations – we can go through a whole list with you – understand the risk of doing business with Iran and are no longer doing so. Unless and until Iran complies with its obligations under the NPT and all relevant UN Security Council resolutions, we will continue to ratchet up the pressure.

We will not close the door on diplomacy, and Iran, like all NPT parties, has a right to peaceful nuclear energy, but it also has a responsibility to fulfill its obligations. There are no short-cuts, and we'll not take our eye off the ball. Even with all the events unfolding in the Middle East, we remain focused on the strategic imperative of assuring that Iran does not acquire nuclear weapons. And then we'll look to others to share our desire for disarmament to join us in giving Pyongyang and Tehran a clear choice between full compliance and increasing pressure or consequences.

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The third element of the president's nuclear strategy – with regard to the third element, the idea to host the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, which I referenced at the beginning, a gathering of 47 nations last year, was

President Obama's personal initiative. And it reflects his conviction that nuclear terrorism proposes the most extreme threat to international security.

The president was satisfied that the Washington Summit built high-level political support for nuclear security and created a concrete work plan to support a global effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials within four years. Now, there's a lot of work to be done in this, and with about one year to go before the next Nuclear Security Summit, which the South Koreans have agreed to hold in Seoul in the spring of 2012, we're quite confident we'll be able to demonstrate significant progress towards fulfilling the work plan that was agreed in Washington.

And in reviewing the results, it's quite impressive, frankly, of the outputs and concrete achievements under the work plan. And we review them quite regularly in the administration. Since 2009, thousands of kilograms of nuclear materials, hundreds of bombs' worth, at over 20 sites around the world have already been removed or eliminated.

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Notably, Kazakhstan has removed 13 tons of fissile material into more secure internal storage and fissile material has been entirely removed from Libya, China, Turkey, Serbia and Romania. Ukraine and Belarus have committed to removing all the HEU from their territories by the time of the Seoul summit, and we're working at home and around the world to convert research reactors so they no longer use HEU fuel.

In locations where material elimination is not possible, we work with other governments to lock down materials through robust security enhancements. Countries are also beefing up transportation and response forces. But nuclear security obviously is more than protecting material with guards and guns and gates. It also means addressing the human element by establishing a security culture – and this has been an important insight to come out of the summit – in training programs for the personnel responsible for protecting nuclear materials.

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Since the Washington Summit, we've signed agreements with Japan, China, South Korea and India to establish and work together on regional centers of excellence to provide training and education for nuclear-security officials. During the president's recent trip, Brazil agreed to consider establishing a similar center for Latin America – regional center for Latin America. Other training facilities are being established in Italy, Kazakhstan and Algeria.

Nuclear security requires funding, but it is money well-spent. We have a difficult budget environment. For its part, the Obama administration has committed an additional \$10 billion to the Global Partnership to help countries pay for nuclear and bio-security upgrades. In that respect, again, I want to emphasize that the president's commitment to securing adequate funding for United States nuclear security nonproliferation programs in the 2011-2012 budget, even in these financial times, is not something that we can afford to skimp on.

Finally, the fourth element – we're making progress on the fourth element of the Prague Agenda, building a new international framework to support peaceful uses of nuclear energy without the risk of – without increasing the risk of proliferation. Clearly, all nations with nuclear-energy programs will need to take full account of the lessons to be learned from the Fukushima accident in Japan, since the safe operation of nuclear plants and safe storage of nuclear waste must be our paramount concern, wherever we live.

Here in the United States, we will test our assumptions, review our procedures, strengthen our regulations. The crisis also highlights the importance of strengthening the IEA's mandate to establish and continually improve nuclear-security standards in guidance and supporting the agency's program to assist member states in the application of the standards.

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But at the same time, need for low-carbon sources of electricity will continue to grow in the decades ahead, which means that nuclear power will remain an important element in the global energy portfolio. And we must be just as vigilant in minimizing proliferation risks as we are at minimizing safety risks. That is why the United States can work with nations around the world to ensure they can access peaceful power without increasing the risk of proliferation. In this respect, we continue to work with the Nuclear Suppliers Group to reach agreement on tougher criteria governing the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies for civil purposes.

And as I said earlier, we also continue to work with the IAEA to implement the fuel-bank concept and other multilateral approaches to the nuclear-fuel cycle. And we are committed to developing commercial concepts for nuclear-fuel leasing so all countries can benefit from nuclear energy without spreading dangerous technology and materials.

So despite many pressing challenges around the world, here and at home, I'm here to express President Obama's strong and enduring commitment to the Prague Agenda. It really has been at the center of his affirmative approach to a national-security policy. As the president said at Prague, and I quote, "some argue that the spread of these weapons cannot be stopped, cannot be checked, that we are destined to live in a world where more nations and people possess the ultimate tools of destruction." He said, "Such a fatalism is a deadly adversary, tantamount to conceding that the use of nuclear weapons is inevitable. And this, of course, we cannot accept."

[00:41:50]

We cannot succeed without your help. This community of international nuclear experts and former officials, think tank, businesspeople, academics and activists will provide the essential bedrock for government action, as I said at the top of my talk. You're often able to do things that government can't or won't do, and we look to you to, again, to stimulate initiatives, build public support, provide constructive advice and hatch creative ideas.

Working as partners, we can fulfill the Prague Agenda and we can move closer to the vision we share – the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. I appreciate your patience, allowing me to push through all that material, to review what we've done to date and our plans for the next phase. And again, thank you for your work and thank you for having me here today. Thanks a lot. (Applause.)

MS. MATHEWS: Because of Tom's schedule, he can't stay for Q&A, but I do want to thank him for an extraordinary "tour de raison" of where we're going and for what this administration – the leadership it has shown has just been terrific. Thanks.

(Applause.)

[00:43:13]

*Transcript Not Checked Against Delivery*

MR. DONILON: Again, I really appreciate it and I look forward to my nomination – (inaudible) – but at some point along the way here. (Applause.) Thank you very much.

MS. MATHEWS: It's a long route to carry, right? (Laughter, applause.)

Let me close just by inviting you all to a reception that's out in the hall. So we've done our hard work, now we can play a bit.

(END)